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Security Policies for Sharing Knowledge
in Virtual Communities
Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre
Abstract—Knowledge management exploits the new opportuni-
ties of sharing knowledge among members of virtual communities
in distributed computer networks, and knowledge-management
systems are therefore modeled and designed as multiagent sys-
tems. In this paper, normative multiagent systems for secure
knowledge management based on access-control policies are
studied. It is shown how distributed access control is realized by
means of local policies of access-control systems for documents of
knowledge providers, and by means of global community policies
regulating these local policies. Moreover, it is shown how such a
virtual community of multiple knowledge providers respects the
autonomy of the knowledge providers.
Index Terms—Knowledge management, multiagent systems,
normative systems, policies, virtual communities.
I. INTRODUCTION
MANY multiagent systems for knowledge managementhave been proposed. For example, KAoS[1] is a sys-
tem for the management of technical information contained in
documents, KRAFT [2] aims at fusing information from differ-
ent sources, FRODO [3] represents distributed organizational
memories, and MARS [4] is an adaptive social network for
information access. Van Elst et al. [5] observe several reasons
why multiagent systems are useful for knowledge manage-
ment. The autonomy as well as proactiveness of agents help
accommodating to the reality that knowledge workers typi-
cally adopt knowledge-management goals with a low priority.
The flexibility to adapt to unforeseen situations of agents and
multiagent systems helps knowledge management to deal with
changing environments, such as the addition of new members
to the knowledge-management system [6]. Moreover, agent
technology provides tools and models to develop knowledge-
management systems, for example, to incorporate legacy sys-
tems into modern distributed information systems.
However, there is no consensus on how multiagent systems
can be used to deal with security considerations in knowledge
management. In this paper, we address two requirements of
secure distributed knowledge management.
1) Knowledge providers should not give up their autonomy
to prohibit access to users they do not trust, even when
they satisfy the security rules of the virtual community.
Manuscript revised January 9, 2006. This paper was recommended by
Associate Editors H. R. Rao and S. J. Upadhyaya.
G. Boella is with the Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Torino,
Torino 10149, Italy (e-mail: guido@di.unito.it).
L. van der Torre is with the University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg L-1359,
Luxembourg (e-mail: leendert@vandertorre.com).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSMCA.2006.871793
2) The policy rules for managing knowledge in a secure
way concern not only which knowledge the users are
prohibited or permitted to access, but also which regula-
tions the community members are allowed or obliged to
enforce.
Traditionally, multiagent systems are developed without se-
curity considerations in mind, by focussing on the coordination
of cooperative agents. Likewise, knowledge-management sys-
tems are traditionally developed without any security consider-
ations, for example, because the users of the systems know each
other, share the same goal, and share a fixed set of administra-
tive rules. When passing from knowledge management in teams
to knowledge management in virtual communities, the flow of
knowledge must be subject to restrictions [7], [8].
We introduce a model of policies for secure knowledge
management in virtual communities satisfying the above re-
quirements by modeling distributed knowledge management by
means of normative multiagent systems (NMAS). Knowledge
providers are modeled as normative systems creating their own
norms. Global policies are enforced by detective rather than
preventative control, such that global policies can be violated
by knowledge providers if they believe this is necessary. Var-
ious types of agent types can be modeled to reflect ways in
which agents can be motivated, such as norm internalizing
agents, respectful agents, and selfish agents. Games among
agents are used to analyze interaction in secure knowledge
management.
We illustrate our model of secure knowledge management by
highlighting an important subtlety involved in global policies
regulating local policies. It is concerned with the notion of
entitlement, which distinguishes between users that are only
permitted to access knowledge, and users that are also entitled
to it in the sense that knowledge providers are obliged to permit
them access [9]. The additional issue discussed, formalized,
and analyzed in this paper is that global policies do not only
describe who is entitled to access resources, because the game-
theoretic analysis shows that this is too weak to obtain the
desired system behavior. Global policies do not only refer to
the existence of local norms, but they have to refer also to the
enforcement of the norms by the local provider recognizing and
sanctioning violations.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss
decentralized control in secure knowledge management. In
Section III, we discuss our two requirements, which are detailed
in Sections IV and V. In Sections VI and VII, we present the
logical model, and in Section VIII, we apply it to an example
of global policies concerned with entitlement.
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II. SECURE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
Knowledge management is a management discipline taking
advantage of new technologies like peer-to-peer, multiagent,
and normative systems respecting the distributed nature of
knowledge in organizations.
A. Distributed Knowledge Management
Van Elst et al. define knowledge management as “the system-
atic, holistic approach for sustainably improving the handling
of knowledge on all levels of an organization (individual,
group, organizational and inter-organizational level) in order to
support the organization’s business goals, such as innovation,
quality, cost effectiveness, etc.” [5].
Knowledge is distributed in organizations, since the divi-
sion of labor in modern companies leads to a distribution of
resources, and knowledge management has to respect the dis-
tributed nature of knowledge in organizations. Bonifacio et al.
explain that knowledge is the result of different perspectives
and partial interpretations of world portions or domains, called
the subjectivity and sociality of knowledge, and therefore, it
should not be viewed as an absolute monolithic matter, but as
a “system of local ‘knowledges’ continuously negotiated by
communities of ‘knowers’” [10].
Van Elst et al. observe that the distributed nature of knowl-
edge in organizations “is not a ‘bug’ but rather a feature
which is not only a matter of physical or technical location of
some file” [5]. For example, knowledge management typically
resides in environments subject to frequent changes, either
in the organizational structure, in business processes, or in
the information-technology infrastructure, and centralized so-
lutions are often ill suited to deal with continuous modification
in the enterprise.
B. Multiagent Systems
Due to technological innovations knowledge-management
systems are no longer limited to a single organization [10].
Van Elst et al. observe that “the role of information technology
as an enabling factor is also widely recognized and . . . a
variety of proposals exist showing how to support knowledge
management with specialized information systems” [5].
For example, Bonifacio et al. argue that a member of a
distributed knowledge-management system can be seen “as a
peer [of a peer-to-peer system] that manages and has control
over a set of local technologies, applications and services. . . . In
order to join the system, every member must provide resources
or services to the others” [11].
As another example, Tacla and Barthes develop a multiagent-
system architecture for knowledge management, because
“knowledge is contained in the information produced, retrieved
and exchanged among members of the projects,” which re-
sults in “a distributed group memory where each member
keeps part of the knowledge of the team.” They introduce
a multiagent-system architecture for knowledge-management
systems, because, “like in a team, a multiagent system is com-
posed by a group of possibly heterogeneous and autonomous
agents” [12].
C. Secure Knowledge Management
Secure knowledge management is an important issue, be-
cause an organization’s knowledge is easy to view, steal, manip-
ulate, and delete. For example, Mundy and Chadwick discuss
the need of secure knowledge management in the health-care
industry. As this industry “enters the era of knowledge man-
agement it must place security at the foundation of the tran-
sition. Risks are pervasive to every aspect of information and
knowledge management. . . . In an age where risks and security
threats are ever-increasing, secure knowledge management is
an essential business practice” [13].
The national information systems security glossary
(NSTISSI 4009) distinguishes the following five components
of secure knowledge management. Authentication is a security
measure to establish the validity of a message or verifying the
eligibility of an individual to receive information. Authorization
is the set of rights granted to a user to access, read, insert, or
delete data. Data security or privacy is the protection from
unauthorized disclosure. Data integrity is the requirement that
data are unchanged from their source. Information security
policy is the set of organizational guidelines, rules, regulations,
and procedures that are used to protect an organization. It
emphasizes that all components are essential and mutually
supportive. For example, authentication without authorization
would mean that only valid users could gain access but could
execute any operation.
It also observes that, without an information security policy,
there would be no apparent requirement for secure practices,
and security would either be ignored or implemented in an
ad hoc manner, and thus, control could be either too rigid or
completely missing.
D. Normative Multiagent Systems and Access Control
Secure knowledge management takes advantage of new
technologies like normative multiagent systems, such as
access-control techniques, languages, and models for policy
requirements, etc. Normative multiagent systems can be used
as a software engineering method to develop secure knowledge-
management systems, both providing high-level specifications
as well as system realizations. Moreover, normative multiagent-
system models can be used to analyze the system, or simulate
solutions before they are built.
The NSTISSI acknowledges the importance of access con-
trol, and mentions various models. Discretionary access control
can be viewed as an owner-based administration of users’
rights, where the owner has authority over which other users
can access the object. Discretionary access control has some
limitations, in particular, in the way the owner can delegate
his discretionary power to other people. Mandatory access
control is based on security labels given to objects (secu-
rity classification) and users (security clearance). Role-based
access control has been developed to enhance maintenance
and scalability. Permissions are granted to roles that are as-
signed to users. A security officer may have the right to
assign roles to users without having an access right to the
resources.
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III. TWO REQUIREMENTS AND SOME CONSEQUENCES
In this section, we discuss two requirements for the develop-
ment of an integrated approach to distributed knowledge man-
agement and security, which we use to motivate and evaluate
our multiagent model for secure knowledge management.
A. Autonomy of Local Knowledge Providers
A multiinstitutional or multiorganizational set of agents is
a virtual community [14] if they use a set of rules, a policy,
to specify how to share their resources, like documents and
knowledge. A virtual community can be modeled as a system
containing role-playing agents. Every agent in the community
can play both the role of a document user as well as that of a
document provider, because agents do not only use documents,
but they also put the documents they own at disposal to the other
participants of the community. Document providers retain the
control of their documents and they specify in local policies the
conditions of use of their documents.
The knowledge providers prefer not to give up their own
power to enforce local policies for the access to the documents
they control. For example, as Sadighi Firozabadi et al. [15]
argue, there are “cases where security administrators are not
fully trustworthy,” for example, when multinational virtual
communities are headed by foreign countries with varying
security standards. The agents participating in the community
are heterogeneous and change frequently, so they cannot be
assumed to be always cooperative and to act in accordance to
the system policies, both when requesting access to documents
and when providing access to their documents. Decentralized
authorities can cope in a better way with local idiosyncratic
situations: “each party of the network can decide in each cir-
cumstance whether to accept credentials presented by a second
party” [16]. Bonifacio et al. call it the principle of autonomy:
“each community has a high degree of autonomy to manage its
local knowledge” [10].
B. Local and Global Security Policies
However, the need of leaving autonomy to the knowledge
providers must be balanced with the requirement that their
local access policies should be organized according to a global
policy defining how the knowledge should be shared among
participants. The distinction between local and global poli-
cies is analogous to the distinction between local and global
knowledge. As van Elst et al. [5] observe, “departments, groups
and individual experts develop their particular views on a
given subject. These views are motivated and justified by the
particularities of the actual work, goals and situation. Obtaining
a single, globally agreed upon vocabulary (or ontologies) within
a level of detail which is sufficient for all participants, may incur
high costs (e.g., for negotiation)” [5]. In virtual communities,
global access control cannot be directly implemented, since
nobody owns all the documents. There is no central manager
of a system permitting agents to access the resources it owns
and controls, according to the policies defined by itself. Such a
centralized administration could be a too heavy burden and it
can affect the core business activities of the system.
The centralized management of resources owned by the
single resource providers is only partially performed by a
community agent [7], which is in charge for maintaining the
list of registered members and offering brokerage services for
available information sources, but not for policing accesses
to resources. The global policies are issued and enforced, for
example, by a community authorization service (CAS): “A
community runs a CAS server to keep track of its membership
and fine-grained access-control policies. A user wishing to
access community resources contacts the CAS server, which
delegates rights to the user based on the request and the user’s
role within the community. These rights are in the form of
capabilities which users can present at a resource to gain access
on behalf of the community” [14].
Representations of local access-control policies can be ob-
tained from existing theories of access control. Therefore, as
observed by Pearlman et al. [14], “a key problem associated
with the formation and operation of distributed virtual com-
munities is that of how to specify and enforce community
policies.” In the remainder of this paper, this key problem is
discussed and analyzed in our model of normative multiagent
systems, which contains various incentives to motivate knowl-
edge providers.
C. Incentives for Knowledge Providers
Since knowledge providers are on the one hand autonomous,
but on the other hand cannot be coerced to provide their
services or to deny them to users, it is necessary that these local
providers are provided with incentives to implement the global
policies by means of local ones. In other words, knowledge
providers must be motivated by rewards and sanctions, such as
the exclusion from the community. Moreover, there also has to
be a monitoring system detecting violations and enforcing
sanctions.
Sanction-based control implies also that an agent may influ-
ence negatively the behavior of other agents. In the terminology
of Sichman et al. [17], other agents depend on it. In our model,
this dependence is the essential precondition for the ability to
issue policies. In this sense, the control of resources does not
mean only that a given service is not provided if the provider
does not want to, for example, the files of a web server cannot
be accessed if it does not provide an answer to a request.
Sanction-based control implies, for example, that agents depend
on the global authority for their membership of the community.
If knowledge providers do not behave according to its policies,
then they are denied citizenship. At the local level, agents
depend on the provider for the current and future access to the
local resource.
Summarizing, we have to deal with the autonomy of local
providers by modeling the security policies of the system, but
also to limit the autonomy of agents, defining their responsibil-
ities and roles. In particular, the respect of norms must be moti-
vated in two distinct ways. Knowledge users must be provided
with an incentive to respect the norms, and local knowledge
providers must be motivated to issue policies respecting the
global ones, and to enforce them.
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IV. NORMATIVE MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS
To deal with the requirement that local knowledge providers
are autonomous, we model each knowledge provider as a
normative system. We thus say that an agent is autonomous in
the literal sense of “making its own norms.” Consequently, in a
virtual community, we have to deal with the interaction among
normative systems.
A. Norms and Control
The role of norms in local and global policies is a major
aspect of secure knowledge-management systems. We model
a secure knowledge-management system as a normative multi-
agent system, which are “sets of agents . . . whose interactions
can be regarded as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how
the agents ideally should and should not behave. . . . Impor-
tantly, the norms allow for the possibility that actual behavior
may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of
obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur” [18], where the
norms are used to address security concerns of knowledge-
management systems. Note that the notion of a normative
system regulating an agent society has also fruitfully been
employed elsewhere, such as electronic commerce, theories
of fraud and deception, of trust dynamics and reputation,
etc. [19].
Since there is no plausible way to enforce the respect of
global policies by constraining the architecture, it is necessary
to have a normative control mechanism to specify global poli-
cies about local policies. Normative systems contain control
procedures, which are policies and procedures that help to
ensure that management directives are carried out [20], be-
cause, intentionally or not, an agent may fail to comply with
the policy. Moreover, the norms of global policies must be
represented as soft constraints, which are used in detective
control systems where violations can be detected, instead of
hard constraints restricted to preventative control systems, in
which violations are impossible [21]. A typical example of
the former is that you can enter a train without a ticket,
but you may be checked and sanctioned, and an example of
the latter is that you cannot enter a metro station without
a ticket. Detective control is the result of actions of agents
and therefore subject to errors and influenceable by actions of
other agents.
B. Secure Agent Interaction
The conceptual machinery of agents, obligations, norms,
control, roles, policies, organizations, contracts, etc., offered
by normative multiagent systems, is used to describe secure
interaction among humans and systems. Agents must reason
about the fulfillment of norms, the possible violations, and
also what to do to repair such violations. A crucial point
in secure knowledge management is the careful planning of
moves during access control. Accordingly, agents must evaluate
the effects of accessing documents both when making and
evaluating an access request. In particular, since the compliance
of the providers to the policies cannot be taken for granted,
a user must consider whether they will fulfill their commit-
ments or not. To make a prediction about the behavior of a
local provider, it is necessary to consider also the reaction
of the global authority enforcing control by monitoring and
sanctioning violations.
C. Game-Theoretic Approach to Norms
Boella and Lesmo [22] analyze the motivational aspects
of norms in the context of multiagent systems composed of
heterogeneous agents, on the assumption that norms are useless
unless supported by sanctions. They argue that sanctions must
be modeled as actions of the normative system, since it is
not possible to presuppose that they are mere consequences of
violations. Hence, Boella and Lesmo attribute to the normative
system the status of an agent deciding whether the behavior
of agents counts as a violation, and thus deserves to be sanc-
tioned by it.
Boella and Lesmo’s model of agent interaction in normative
systems is based on the philosophical foundations on strategic
interaction in the work of sociologist Goffman [23]. “Strategic
interaction” here means, according to Goffman, taking into
consideration the actions of other agents. Boella and Lesmo call
it the game-theoretic approach to norms.
Inspired by Boella and Lesmo’s game-theoretic approach to
norms, in earlier work [19], we propose a logical framework
for reasoning about obligations and norms. It does not use
a preventative control system, because agents are not con-
strained to respect norms. They can decide whether to respect
norms or not based on a rational balance between the advan-
tage of not respecting a norm and the disadvantage of being
sanctioned. We use goal-based theories developed in artifi-
cial intelligence [24] and agent theory replacing probabilities
and utilities by informational (knowledge, belief) and moti-
vational attitudes (goal, desire), respectively, and the decision
rule by a process of deliberation, in particular, based on the
belief–obligation–intention–desire architecture (BOID) [25].
We replace the equilibria analysis in classical game theory by
Gmytrasiewitcz and Durfee’s recursive modeling [26].
D. New Challenges for Our Game-Theoretic Model
Distributed access control poses new challenges to the game-
theoretic model of normative systems presented in [19]. The
model must be extended with priorities among beliefs to model
the defeasible effects of actions, with permissions as exceptions
to model access rights, and, most importantly, with global
policies regulating local ones. In [19], we consider agents
modeling the contract partner recursively modeling the norma-
tive system. In distributed access control, however, there is no
longer a single normative system, but each knowledge provider
acts as one. In our games, we therefore have to deal with
the interaction among normative systems. Agents recursively
model the local provider, which in turn recursively model
the global authority. Consequently, the relation between the
local and global level, and thus the relation between local and
global policies, plays a central role in the interaction among
normative systems.
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V. GLOBAL POLICIES REGULATING LOCAL POLICIES
To deal with the requirement to model global policies regu-
lating local ones, we consider the rationale of global policies,
called the transmission of will.
A. Transmission of Will
According to von Wright’s principle of transmission of will,
“an authority who orders that something be made obligatory
wants the obligation satisfied. He, as it were, ‘transmits’ his
will through the intermediary of a lower authority. Therefore,
his will is not fulfilled unless the norms which are its immediate
objects are themselves satisfied” [27, p.93].
For example, consider the notion of entitlement. Sadighi
Firozabadi and Sergot [9] define entitlement to a resource by
the obligation of a resource provider to permit access, and
distinguish it from a mere permission of an agent to access
the resource. The following scenario considers entitlement from
the perspective of a local knowledge provider. An agent p has
joined a virtual community n. Its contract for the participation
prescribes that it should provide access to all the members
of the community. Another participating agent, say agent a,
tries to access agent p’s system. However, previous experiences
before joining the community advice agent p that agent a could
damage its resources. Should agent p grant agent a access
to its resources?
The fact that the agent a is entitled to access the resource, in
the sense that the knowledge provider is obliged to permit him
access, is not enough to ensure that he is given access to the
resource, and therefore is not enough for the transmission of
will. Global policies therefore do not refer only to the fact that
a local norm exists, but also to the fact that the local provider
enforces it by recognizing and sanctioning violations.
B. Policies for the Transmission of Will
In the above scenario for entitlement, the management of the
community is organized in at least two levels: the global level
(agent n) and the local one (agent p). Agent n is a distinguished
authority, like the community authorization service playing the
role of a global authority issuing global policies and negotiating
the conditions for the participation of agents to the virtual
community. Agent p is a provider of a document it controls.
Moreover, all the agents (n, p, and a) can also play the role of
users of the resources of the community.
Policies concern the behavior of participants. For example,
at the global level, participants should not communicate their
passwords, or distribute copyrighted files by means of the
system. Otherwise, they are banned from the community, since
the membership to the system is under the control of the global
authority. At the local level, policies forbid agents to store
files exceeding 1 GB on a file-sharing service, or they permit
participants of the community to download copyrighted files
from the web server.
Moreover, there are policies that apply to other policies, such
as global policies that constrain or permit local policies [28].
In our scenario, agent n obliges agent p to permit members of
the community to access its resources. Analogously, the global
authority could oblige local ones to forbid access, permit-
to-permit access, or permit-to-forbid access. However, it is not
sufficient that the global obligation to permit or oblige access is
satisfied by the fact that the local provider issues a permission
or an obligation. Norms are ineffective if they are not enforced
by the normative system who issued them: violations of norms
should be recognized as such and sanctioned.
Reconsider the notion of entitlement. An agent n obliges
agent p to permit agent a to do x if agent n obliges agent p
not to consider ¬x as a violation. The local normative system,
however, can still violate this global policy and prevent access
to users if it prefers to face the sanction with respect to permit-
ting access. It is possible that agent p does not grant agent a the
resource it is entitled to by the global policy, and this may be
considered rational. Facing a sanction by the global authority,
e.g., being excluded by the community for a certain period of
time, is preferred to the possibility that agent a damages the
system, e.g., agent a could create a denial-of-service attack.
Thus, the autonomy of the provider is guaranteed, even if a
provider violating a global policy must take the consequences
of its actions into account. The example is formalized in
Section VIII.
C. Transmission of Will in Our Game-Theoretic Model
In our model, obligations are defined in terms of goals of a
normative system. The attribution of goals and beliefs to norma-
tive systems is an instance of Dennett’s intentional stance [29]:
Agents behave as if they are endowed with such motivational
attitudes. A global obligation by agent n that agent p obliges
agent a to do x implies an obligation that agent p considers ¬x
as a violation and sanctions it. Since, in turn, the obligation of
agent n is expressed in terms of goals that something counts as
a violation, the global obligation by agent n is defined as the
goal that agent p considers ¬x as a violation and the goal that
if p does not do so, then its behavior is considered a violation
by agent n. Analogously, a permission by agent n that p obliges
that agent a does x is expressed as a permission by agent n to
consider ¬x as a violation: Agent n has the goal that agent p
is not considered a violator by agent n if it considers agent a
as a violator.
Our game-theoretic model highlights two important prop-
erties of the transmission of will. First, our game-theoretic
model can be used to show that it is not sufficient that global
norms refer only to the existence of local norms, by illustrating
scenarios in which this is the case, but the local norm is not
enforced.
Second, it gives an additional argument supporting the re-
duction of policies about policies to obligations and permis-
sions about considering something as a violation or not. The
agent does not have to be implemented in terms of explicit
beliefs and goals. The basis for judging an agent cannot be its
implementation, but the basis can be only its behavior. Analo-
gously, the basis to say that an obligation is satisfied cannot be
based on whether a knowledge provider has or does not have a
goal. The only clue we have is its behavior, and in particular,
whether it sanctions or not.
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VI. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present a simplified version of our logical
model of normative multiagent systems introduced in [19]. We
do not discuss constitutive norms, but we add priorities among
beliefs, and undercutters to goals. In the following section,
we discuss the extended games for modeling global policies
regulating local ones.
A. Multiagent Systems
We first introduce the structural concepts and their rela-
tions. A set of propositional variables X describes the aspects
of the world, and we extend it to literals built out of X
(Lit(X)) to consider also the absence of states of affairs. Rules
built out of the literals (Rul(X)) describe the relations among
the propositional variables. A rule l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l is a pair
of a set of literals built from X and a literal built from X:
Rules represent the relations among literals existing in the
agent’s mental attitudes.
Deﬁnition 1: Let X be a set of propositional variables. The
set of literals built from X , Lit(X) is X ∪ {¬x|x ∈ X}, and
the set of rules built from X , written as Rul(X), is defined
by 2Lit(X) × Lit(X), the set of pairs of a set of literals
built from X and a literal built from X . A rule is written as
{l1, . . . , ln} → l; we also write l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l, and when
n = 0, we write 
 → l. Moreover, for x ∈ X , we write ∼x
for ¬x and ∼¬x for x.
The mental attitudes attributed to agents consist of beliefs B,
desires D, goals G, and undercutters H . An undercutter is a
mental attitude expressing the absence of a desire or goal, which
we use in the following section to model permissions as excep-
tions [30]. A mental description function MD associates a rule
in Rul(X) with each belief, desire, goal, and undercutter. We
introduce priority relations to resolve conflicts among mental
attitudes. A function ≥ associates with an agent a transitive
and reflexive relation on the powerset of the motivations and
beliefs containing at least the subset relation. Moreover, various
mental attitudes are attributed to agents by the agent description
relation AD. It associates with each agent a set of beliefs,
desires, goals, and undercutters.
Multiagent systems also contain concepts concerning
informational aspects. First of all, the set of variables whose
truth value is determined by an agent (decision variables) are
distinguished from those which are not directly determined by
the agent (P , the parameters using the terminology of Lang
et al. [31]). Concerning the relations among these concepts,
we have that parameters P are a subset of the propositional
variables X . The complement of P represents the decision
variables controlled by the agents. Hence, we associate to each
agent a subset of X \P by extending the agent description AD.
Deﬁnition 2 (MAS): A multiagent system (MAS) is a tuple
〈A,X,B,D,G,H,AD,MD,≥〉, where:
1) The agents A, propositional variables X , beliefs B, de-
siresD, goalsG, and undercuttersH are six finite disjoint
sets. We write M = D ∪G for motivations.
2) An agent description AD : A→ 2X∪B∪D∪G∪H is a com-
plete function that maps each agent to a set of variables
(its decision variables), and to its beliefs, desires, goals,
and undercutters. For each agent a ∈ A, we write Xa
for X ∩AD(a), Ba for B ∩AD(a), etc. We write also
P = X \ ∪a∈AXa for the parameters.
3) A mental description MD : B ∪D ∪G ∪H → Rul(X)
is a complete function from the sets of beliefs,
desires, goals, and undercutters to the set of rules
built from X . For S ⊆ B ∪D ∪G ∪H , we write also
MD(S) = {MD(s)|s ∈ S}. Moreover, we write s x→ y
for denoting: s such that MD(s) = x→ y.
4) A priority relation ≥: A→ ((2B × 2B) ∪ (2M × 2M ))
is a function from agents to a transitive and reflexive
relation on the powerset of the mental attitudes containing
at least the subset relation. We write ≥a for ≥ (a).
Example 1 illustrates the running example as a multiagent
system. In conceptual models used in practice as well as in
the more detailed examples in the following sections, we use
meaningful names; here, we use single letters to save space.
Example 1: Let MAS = 〈A,X,B,D,G,H,AD,MD,≥〉
with A = {a,p,n}, P = {q, r}, H = ∅, and X \ P , B, D, G,
AD, MD, and ≥ are given by the following table:
Agent a desires (d1) to get information q to increase its
knowledge by doing x1 (b1), i.e., by making a request to
agent p. Vice versa, agent p desires (d2) to know r by request-
ing it to agent a with action x3. Therefore, both agents a and p
share resources and request them. Moreover, they want to react
to the request of the other one by respectively doing actions x2
and x4 (g1 and g2), which are not desired by the other agent (d3
and d4). These actions are exceptions to the effect of, respec-
tively, requests x1 and x3, and thus, they prevent their results
(q and r). Agent n is monitoring the behavior of agent p and, if
agent p achieves its goal x4 when x1 is true, then it wants (g3)
to perform action x5, which is disliked by agent p (d5).
Finally, only a fragment of the priority relation is given,
because it is only given for singleton motivations and beliefs,
whereas it is defined over sets of motivations.
The example already illustrates a drawback of using only
multiagent systems to describe the example, because there is
no notion of obligation, violation, or sanction. We therefore
introduce normative multiagent systems.
B. Normative Multiagent Systems
A normative multiagent system contains a norm (violation)
description V , a function from agents and literals to the decision
variables of the normative system together with the parameters.
We write Va(x) for the decision variable representing that there
is a violation x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) by agent a ∈ A.
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Deﬁnition 3: A normative multiagent system NMAS is
a tuple 〈A,X,B,D,G,H,AD,MD,≥, V 〉 that extends
a multiagent system with a partial (violation) function
V : A× Lit(X)→ X \ P from agents and literals to decision
variables. We write Va(x) for V (a, x).
We can introduce decision variables like Vb(Va(x)), where
agent b is considered as a violator if it considers x ∈ Lit(X) as
a violation done by agent a. Analogously, Vb(¬Va(x)) means
that agent b is considered as a violator, because agent b does
not consider x as a violation done by agent a.
Example 2 (Continued): The agents a, p, n in Example 1 are
now interpreted as a virtual community where a is considered
only a user of the system, and p only as a local provider
owning a document, and n is a global authority. Assume
that V is defined as: Va(x1) = x4, Vp(x4) = Vp(Va(q)) = x5,
and Vc(y) = undefined for all other values of c ∈ A and
y ∈ Lit(X). This means that if x4 is the case, then x1 is
recognized as a violation of agent a, and if x5 is the case, then
doing Va(x1) is recognized as a violation of agent p.
C. Obligation
The definition of obligation contains several clauses. The first
clause says that the obligation is in the desires and in the goals
of a normative system b (“your wish is my command”). The
second and third clauses can be read as “the absence of ∼x
is considered as a violation.” The association of obligations
with violations is inspired by Anderson’s reduction of deontic
logic to alethic modal logic [32]. The third clause says that the
normative system desires that there are no violations. The fourth
and fifth clauses relate violations to sanctions and assume that
normative system b is motivated to apply sanctions only as long
as there is a violation; otherwise, the norm would have no effect.
Finally, for the same reason, we assume in the last clause that
the agent does not like the sanction.
Deﬁnition 4 (Obligation): Let a normative multiagent sys-
tem NMAS be 〈A,X,B,D,G,H,AD,MD,≥, V 〉. Agent
a ∈ A is obliged in NMAS to decide to do x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P )
with sanction s ∈ Lit(Xb ∪ P ) if Y ⊆ Lit(X) by normative
system b ∈ A, written as NMAS |= Oa,b(x, s|Y ), if and only
if the following conditions are met.
1) Y → x ∈MD(Db) ∩MD(Gb): If normative system b
believes Y , then it desires x and has x as a goal.
2) Y ∪ {∼x} → Va(∼x) ∈MD(Db) ∩MD(Gb): If nor-
mative system b believes Y and ∼x, then it has the goal
and the desire Va(∼x): to recognize ∼x as a violation by
agent a.
3) 
 → ¬Va(∼x) ∈MD(Db): Normative system b desires
that there are no violations.
4) Y ∪ {Va(∼x)} → s ∈MD(Db) ∩MD(Gb): if norma-
tive system b believes Y and decides Va(∼x), then it de-
sires and has as a goal that it sanctions agent a with s.
5) Y →∼s ∈MD(Db): If normative system b believes Y ,
then it desires not to sanction, ∼s. The normative system
only sanctions in case of violation.
6) Y →∼s ∈MD(Da): If agent a believes Y , then it de-
sires ∼s, which expresses that it does not like to be
sanctioned.
VII. GAMES WITH GLOBAL POLICIES
We first introduce documents and permissions, then we de-
fine global policies, and finally, we introduce the extended game
theory.
A. Documents
We introduce some syntactic sugar. Management of knowl-
edge in the multiagent system is represented by access of
documents DC. We are inspired by Lee [33]: “we use the term
‘document’ since most information parcels in business practice
are mapped on paper documents.” Of course, knowledge is
distinct from information. In the context of knowledge manage-
ment, knowledge is described as information that has a use or
purpose. Whereas information can be placed onto a computer,
knowledge is emergent and socially constructed, in the sense
that it exists in the heads of people: Knowledge is information
to which an intent has been attached. The distinction between
the two can be reflected by the internal structure of the doc-
uments, and how agents update their mental states once they
receive documents. For example, receiving information only
updates the agent’s beliefs, whereas receiving knowledge can
extend the agent’s capabilities. In this paper, we do not consider
the internal structure of knowledge documents, but we focus on
operations agents can perform on documents.
Deﬁnition 5 (Documents): Let DC be a set of documents.
Let DAa = {f(a, d)| d ∈ DC} be a set of actions of the agent
a ∈ A. f(a, d) ∈ DAa can belong to the decision variables
Xa or it can be a parameter such that there exists a decision
variable x ∈ Xa such that x→ f(a, d) ∈ Ba: f(a, d) is an
effect of a decision variable x of agent a representing agent a’s
beliefs that x is a fallible tentative of accessing document d.
The following example illustrates that similar syntactic sugar
is also used for the description of the state of the world.
Example 3 (Continued): Possible actions on the documents
are the create, read, update, and delete (CRUD) actions of
the CRUD security model in databases: e.g., x1 = read(a, d)
and q = info(a). To have an information info(a), agent a
believes it has to perform action read(a, d) (b1) as an attempt to
get it.
NMAS |= Oap(¬read(a, d), san|
), agent a is obliged not
to read document d ∈ DC (read(a, d) ∈ Xa), or else it is
sanctioned with san ∈ Lit(Xp ∪ P ), if
g4 d6 
 → ¬read(a, d) ∈ Gp,Dp
g2 d7 read(a, d)→ Va(read(a, d)) ∈ Gp,Dp
d8 
 → ¬Va(read(a, d)) ∈ Dp
g5 d9 Va(read(a, d))→ san ∈ Gp,Dp
d10 
 → ¬san ∈ Dp
d3 
 → ¬san ∈ Da
B. Conditional Permission
To model permission, we consider clauses analogous to the
ones for obligation. Since most clauses have to do with sanc-
tions, we have to consider only clauses analogous to the first
two clauses of obligation. Whereas obligation corresponds to a
kind of normative goal in our model, permission corresponds
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to a kind of undercutter to a normative goal. Moreover, whereas
obligations imply, under some conditions, a violation, permis-
sions may imply the absence of a violation.
Deﬁnition 6 (Permission): Let a normative multiagent sys-
tem NMAS be 〈A,X,B,D,G,H,AD,MD,≥, V 〉. Agent
a ∈ A is permitted to decide to do x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) if
Y ⊆ Lit(X) in NMAS by normative system b ∈ A, written
as NMAS |= Pa,b(x|Y ), if and only if
1) Y → x ∈MD(Hb): If normative system b believes Y ,
then it does not have a desire or goal x.
2) Y ∪ {x} → ¬Va(x) ∈MD(Db) ∩MD(Gb): If norma-
tive system b believes Y and x, then it does not want to
count x as a violation.
C. Policies
Consider now the notion of entitlement: An agent is obliged
to permit another agent. If we would add nested obligations
and permissions as in standard modal logic, then an obliga-
tion to permit Ob,c(Pa,b(x|Y ), s |W ) could be represented by
Ob,c(Ψ, s|W ), where Ψ is, respectively, Y → x ∈MD(Hb)
and Y ∧ x→ ¬Va(x) ∈MD(Gb). Note that in the latter for-
mula, as well as the other formulas in the subsection, we write
conjunction ∧ for the union ∪ to facilitate the reading of these
formulas. This reduces to 12 clauses, since each of the two
obligations is made of the following six clauses:
1) W → Ψ ∈MD(Dc) ∩MD(Gc);
2) W ∧ ¬Ψ→ Vb(¬Ψ) ∈MD(Dc) ∩MD(Gc);
3) 
 → ¬Vb(¬Ψ) ∈MD(Dc);
4) W ∧ Vb(¬Ψ)→ s ∈MD(Dc) ∩MD(Gc);
5) W →∼ s ∈MD(Dc);
6) W →∼ s ∈MD(Db).
Our reduction, instead, claims that, for global policies, a
nested modality is too weak, and we therefore remove the
inner modalities. For example, the second clause reduces to
Ob,c(¬Va(x), s|Y ∧W ∧ x). This removal, however, does not
have to lead to something making sense. For example, for the
first clause Ob,c(x, s|Y ∧W ) is too strong, as x is not obliga-
tory, but only permitted. Thus, we define the policy concerned
with obligation to permit as only the second clause.
Deﬁnition 7: A global policy of global authority c ∈ A in
context W ⊆ Lit(X) with sanction s ∈ Lit(Xc ∪ P ) for the
entitlement of agent a ∈ A to x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) from knowl-
edge provider b ∈ A if Y ⊆ Lit(X) is
Ob,c(¬Va(x), s|Y ∧W ∧ x).
Consequently, the global policy implies the following six
clauses, which illustrate that removal of nested obligations and
permissions has left a nested violation predicate:
1) W ∧ Y ∧ x→ ¬Va(x) ∈MD(Dc) ∩MD(Gc);
2) W∧Y ∧x∧ Va(x)→Vb(Va(x)) ∈ MD(Dc) ∩MD(Gc);
3) 
 → ¬Vb(Va(x)) ∈MD(Dc);
4) W ∧ Y ∧ Vb(Va(x))→ s ∈MD(Dc) ∩MD(Gc);
5) W ∧ Y →∼ s ∈MD(Dc);
6) W ∧ Y →∼ s ∈MD(Db).
Analogously, policies concerned with an obligation to oblige
contain clauses like Ob,c(Va(∼x), s|Y ∧W∧ ∼x), a per-
mission to permit contains Pb,c(¬Va(x)|Y ∧W ∧ x), and a
permission to oblige Pb,c(Va(∼x)|Y ∧W∧ ∼x). Moreover,
they may also contain additional clauses. For example, if
the global authority explicitly states the sanctions for the
local providers, then we may have several clauses such as
Ob,c(s′, s|Y ∧W∧ ∼x ∧ Va(∼x)) for the obligation to oblige
and Pb,c(s′|Y ∧W∧ ∼x ∧ Va(∼x)) for the permission to
oblige.
D. Games
The agents believe to be in a state that is the result of the
application of the prioritized belief rules.
Deﬁnition 8 (Consequences of Beliefs): Let R be a set of
rules inRul(X),Q a set of literals inLit(X), and≥ a transitive
and reflexive relation on the powerset of R containing at least
the superset relation.
1) out(R,Q) = ∪∞0 outi(R,Q) is the state obtained by
the sequence out0(R,Q) = ∅ and outi+1(R,Q) =
outi(R,Q)∪ {l|L→ l ∈ R and L ⊆ Q ∪ outi(R,Q)};
2) maxfamily(R,Q,≥) is the set of maximal subsetsR′ of
R with respect to set inclusion such that Q ∪ out(R′, Q)
is consistent (does not contain a literal and its negation);
3) preffamily(R,Q,≥) is the set of maximal elements of
maxfamily with respect to the ≥ ordering;
4) outfamily(R,Q,≥) is the output under the elements of
preffamily, {out(R′, Q)|R′ ∈preffamily(R,Q,≥)};
5) x ∈ out(R,Q,≥) iff x ∈ ∩outfamily(R,Q,≥).
Decisions of agents are consistent sets of literals built from
decision variables.
Deﬁnition 9 (Decisions): The set of decisions ∆ of a set
of agents AS = {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A is the set of consistent sets
δ =
⋃
ai∈AS δi ⊆ Lit(X).
To define the optimal decisions, we consider the expected
effects of decisions by applying belief rules and by recursively
modeling the decisions of other agents. These effects are used
to order the decisions using the desire and goal rules. The
unfulfilled motivations of decision δ according to agent a ∈ A
are the set of motivations whose body is part of the closure of
the decision under the belief rules but whose head is not, and
which are not undercut by any rule in H .
Deﬁnition 10 (Recursive Modeling): Given the set of agents
AS = {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A:
1) Given Si = out(Bi,
⋃
0<j<n δj ,≥i) ∪
⋃
0<j<n δj ,
U(δ, ai) is the set of l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l ∈M such that:
1) {l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ Si and l ∈ Si;
2) there does not exist l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l ∈ Hi such that
{l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ Si.
2) A decision δ is optimal for agent ai if and only if it is
optimal for agents ai+1, . . . , an and there is no decision
δ′i such that for all decisions δ′ = δ0 ∪ . . . ∪ δ′i ∪ . . . ∪ δ′n
and δ′′ = δ0 ∪ . . . ∪ δi ∪ . . . ∪ δ′′n optimal for agents
ai+1, . . . , an, we have that U(δ′, ai) >i U(δ′′, ai).
Example 4 (Continued): When δ = {x1, x4}, then
out(Ba, δ,≥a) = {x1, x4, q} and U(δ,a) = {d3 
 → ¬x4},
U(δ,p) = {d2 
 → r}, and U(δ,n) = {g3 x1 ∧ x4 → x5}.
When δ = {x1, x3}, then out(Ba, δ,≥a) = {x1, x3, q, r} and
U(δ,a) = {g1 x3→x2},U(δ,p) = {g2 x1→x4},U(δ,n) = ∅.
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TABLE I
USER a, KNOWLEDGE PROVIDER p, AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY n
VIII. EXAMPLE
Table I illustrates an example of a virtual community com-
posed of a user a, a knowledge provider p, and a CAS
agent n, which establishes the global policy of the community.
When agent a takes its decision δa, it has to minimize its
unfulfilled motivational attitudes. However, when it considers
these attitudes, it must not only consider its decision δa and
its consequences, it must consider also the decision δp of the
local provider p and its consequences, for example, that it is
sanctioned by it. Therefore, agent a recursively considers which
decision the normative system p will take depending on its
different decisions δa. In turn, agent p takes its decision δp
under the light of what will do the authority n it is subject to.
The optimal decision of agent p depends on each decision δa
and also on the optimal decision δn for normative system n
for each decision δa ∪ δp. Instead, given a decision δa ∪ δp, a
decision δn is optimal for agent n if it minimizes the unfulfilled
motivational attitudes in Dn and Gn according to the ≥n
relation, without further recursive modeling.
Agent a reads a document d (read(a, d) ∈ Xa), which is
under the control of agent p to get an information info(a) ∈ P
(read(a, d)→ info(a) ∈ Ba). Moreover, The CAS n issues
global policies addressed to normative system p and p issues
local policies addressed to user a.
The example shows a case of entitlement. Even if the
provider p locally forbids access to the information, agent a
is entitled to do so by the global policy in the context of
some project (project(a) ∈ P ). The local policy is repre-
sented by Oa,p(¬read(a, d), san|
), while the global one
is Op,n(¬Vp(read(a, d))|project(a) ∧ read(a, d)). The sanc-
tion san makes false the effect info(a) of the access to the re-
source d by read(a, d). However, if agent p believes that agent
a is a hacker (hack(a) ∈ P ), it prefers to violate the global
policy with respect to letting agent a access the document.
The bottom three lines of Table I represent the out-
put and unfulfilled motivations when agent a decides to
do δa = {read(a, d)} and agents p and n decide to do
nothing (δp = δn = ∅). Had agent p’s decision been δ′p =
{Va(read(a, d)), san}, then info(a) would not have been true
anymore in out(Ba, δ,≥a), due to the sanction applied by
agent p : the rule san→ ¬info(a) ∈ Ba has priority over the
rule read(a, d)→ info(a) ∈ Ba (b2 > b1). Thus, agent a’s
unfulfilled desires would have been
U(δ′ = δa ∪ δ′p,a) = {
 → info(a),
 → ¬san}.
To take a decision between δp and δ′p, agent p compares
which of its goals and desires remain unsatisfied under the light
of agent n’s reaction: In fact, if agent p decides for δ′p, Uδ′n
would be {Vp(Va(read(a, d)))}.
U(δ′,n) = {
 → ¬Vp(Va(read(a, d)))}
However, U(δ′,p) ≥p U(δ,p) and thus agent p decides δp.
U(δ′,p) = {
 → ¬Vp(Va(read(a, d)))}
U(δ,p) = {read(a, d)→ Va(read(a, d))}
If agent p believes that agent a is a hacker,

 → hack(a) ∈ B′p, i.e., if hack(a) is true in out(B′p, δ,≥p),
then p believes that agent a, by knowing the content of the
document (info(a)), will damage the system, so it prefers that
it does not access it (hack(a)→ ¬info(a) ∈ Dp ∩Gp). In
this case, agent p prefers to be considered a violator by agent n
with respect to allowing agent p trying to access the document,
since its priority is
hack(a)→ ¬info(a) ≥p 
 → ¬Vp(Va(read(a, d))).
Thus, decision δ′′p would be {Va(read(a, d)), san}.
The example can be extended with sanctions toward agent
p in the obvious way. Moreover, obligations to oblige or to
prohibit can be defined analogously. The number of clauses
increases, as discussed in Section VII-C, but the analysis can
be made in the same way.
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IX. RELATED WORK
The problem of striking some balance between local versus
global policies has been studied in other contexts too, as part of
the development of distributed computing systems. Numerous
solutions have been proposed, including that of security in a
grid computing environment [14] as well as in web-services
security architectures [34]. An advantage of the formalization
of the balance introduced in this paper is that it is characterized
using an abstract framework. Another advantage is that norma-
tive multiagent systems offer the formal framework to analyze
or simulate complex scenarios, using the underlying theories of
normative systems and multiagent systems, including ones of
fraud and deception [35].
In particular, the problem has been addressed in the context
of trust-management systems, trust networks, and in reputation-
based systems [36]. These theories and systems originate from
distinct but related traditions (see, e.g., [37] for a discussion of
how trust and norms may be related in a game-theoretic setting).
However, they also have some remarkable similarities. We be-
lieve that further study is needed to investigate the assumptions
of the two approaches. For example, the way in which agents
anticipate the behavior of other agents in normative systems
seems distinct from the way they anticipate behavior in trust
and reputation-based systems.
Moreover, while here we study the decentralization of con-
trol, our framework is used also to cope with the symmetric
issue of how to centralize those aspects of security in distributed
environments that cannot be dealt with at the local level, such
as which are the members of the community and which ones
should be authorized to access a resource. In particular, in [38],
we explore the problem of how local providers can delegate
to other agents the power to authorize access without giving
up their autonomy. We argue that the problem can be solved
by means of counts-as relations [39]: An agent empowered to
authorize can issue declarations that are considered as autho-
rizations by the local provider. Moreover, these authorizations
appear in the conditions of permissions, which act as exceptions
to the prohibitions concerning general users. In this way, on
the one hand, a CAS agent can regulate at the central level
which agents are allowed to access resources on the basis of
the up-to-date list of members and policies; on the other hand,
the local providers are not overburdened by the management of
information about memberships and maintain their autonomy
to issue obligations, prohibitions, and permissions to regulate
access to their resources.
We believe that a further study into the similarities and
distinctions between these areas can lead to some fruitful
exchanges of ideas. A contribution of the normative systems’
framework is the logical analysis methods, the interaction
among the logical framework and the game-theoretic ele-
ments, and the possibilities to simulate fraud and deception.
Also, trust and reputation mechanisms can be used to enrich
existing normative multiagent systems. For example, if one
agent believes that another one is going to harm resources
under its control, this information should be propagated to
the global level. There should be some form of mechanism
to capture such “reputation” information in the normative
architecture.
Normative systems have traditionally been concerned with
more static systems such as bureaucratic and legal systems. Re-
cent work on normative multiagent systems is concerned with
applications in modern electronic networks, which are much
more dynamic and uncertain. It therefore takes its inspiration
from social theories such as Searle’s work on the construction
of social reality, and is concerned with the powers of agents to
change the normative system [19].
The formal framework presented in this paper builds on
deontic logic and BOID agent architecture. It extends our
previous work on normative multiagent systems, e.g., in [19],
in various ways. For example, it introduces the notion of
prioritized beliefs, documents, and most importantly, it studies
more complex games involving an arbitrary number of agents,
within a realistic setting. Whereas arbitrary games among a
large number of agents get very complex, in particular in the
context of uncertainty and observations, and introduce new
conceptual problems, see, e.g., [40] for an example, the games
discussed in this paper are relatively simple due to the fact that
each agent has to consider only the decision of the next agent
who can consider it as a violator.
We do not define permissions as the absence of obligation,
so-called negative permission, but as exceptions to obligations,
a kind of positive permission. For a discussion on the issues
involved in modeling permission, see [41]. Permission is sim-
pler than obligation, since permissions cannot lead to violations
and sanctions. It is only due to entitlement that knowledge
providers may be sanctioned when they do not permit a user
to access documents, but the user itself cannot be a violator and
be sanctioned due to its permissions to access a document. The
various clauses of obligation have been motivated by a game-
theoretic analysis [19]. The first clause ensures that “respectful”
agents internalizing the goals of the normative system will
fulfill their obligation under typical circumstances; the second
and third clauses do so for “respectful” agents that do not want
to be considered as violators even if they do not internalize the
norm as one of their goals. The other clauses do so for “selfish”
types of agents, which care only about not being sanctioned.
Similar games can be played to show that the clauses of
permission are necessary, again for norm internalizing agents
and other types of agents, respectively. Since permissions are
exceptions to obligations, a “respectful” internalizing agent
would still adopt the content of the obligation as one of its
goals. For this reason, we added the first clause containing an
undercutter to the goal of the obligation the permission is an
exception of.
Here, we only discuss regulative norms and we do not discuss
constitutive ones, though the new models introduced in this
paper can also be extended with constitutive norms along the
lines discussed in [19]. For constitutive rules, we adopt the same
strategy of attributing mental attitudes to normative systems.
Whereas regulative norms are defined in terms of goals of the
normative systems, constitutive norms establishing what counts
as institutional facts are defined in terms of the beliefs of the
normative system.
BOELLA AND VAN DER TORRE: SECURITY POLICIES FOR SHARING KNOWLEDGE IN VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES 11
X. SUMMARY
Any scalable solution for secure knowledge management has
to be able to distribute not only the knowledge-management
system, but also the security system. Once knowledge manage-
ment becomes distributed, security becomes distributed too. A
distributed security system assumes that security concerns are
incorporated from the first design of the distributed knowledge-
management system. For example, Kolp [7] analyzes the de-
velopment of knowledge-management systems and argues that
“existing proprietary information management tools block the
exchange of information between applications and users,” and
therefore “a holistic approach is required in the design of
information technology infrastructures as well as the actual
business process reengineering for a successful knowledge
management effort.”
We develop an integrated approach to distributed knowledge
management and security, using multiagent systems and access-
control policies in virtual communities. Distributed access
control is realized by a virtual community of multiple knowl-
edge providers with their own local access-control system to
their documents and local policies, and by global community
policies regulating these local policies. The issue at stake is
the rational balance of global versus local control in virtual
communities. Knowledge providers must be autonomous, but
not unconstrained.
Autonomy of local knowledge providers is ensured by mod-
eling each member of the virtual community as a normative
system interacting with other members and posing prohibitions
and permissions about access to its knowledge. Participants do
not give up their autonomy to prohibit access to knowledge
to users they do not trust, even when the users satisfy the
security rules of the virtual community. Resource providers
are therefore not forced, but motivated by the global author-
ity to behave as required. Local providers consider whether
to violate global policies in some situations. Games among
the three agents involved in knowledge access—the user, the
knowledge provider, and the global authority—explain how
these motivations work. The games can be used also to analyze
the knowledge-management system, or to simulate it.
Global community policies regulate local policies based on
von Wright’s notion of transmission of will. The rules of
policies for secure knowledge management do not concern
only what knowledge the users are prohibited or permitted to
access, but they also concern which regulations the knowl-
edge providers are allowed or obliged to enforce. This is a
challenge, because rules refer usually to the actions of users
and not to other rules, which are obligatory or permitted to
adopt. In our model, we incorporate a mechanism for interac-
tion among normative systems. We generalize the framework
with decentralized systems composed of global authorities and
local providers; they are both normative systems, but global
authorities can specify duties and permissions of local providers
concerning the local policies.
A game-theoretic analysis is used to define global policies.
These games describe interactions among the agents in the
normative multiagent systems. Agents must evaluate the effects
of accessing documents both when making and evaluating
an access request. In particular, since the compliance of the
providers to the policies cannot be taken for granted, a user
must consider whether they will fulfill their commitments or
not. To make a prediction about the behavior of a local provider,
it is necessary to consider also the reaction of the global
authority enforcing control by monitoring and sanctioning
violations.
For example, the notion of entitlement, i.e., when a knowl-
edge provider is obliged to permit access to a user, could
be interpreted as the obligation of the provider to create a
permission. However, the knowledge provider can create the
permission, but still does not let the user access the document.
In such a case, the knowledge provider does not act according to
the permissions it created itself. This scenario shows that such
definition of global policies is ineffective. The game-theoretic
analysis of the notion of entitlement in normative multiagent
systems illustrates that this definition of global policy is inef-
fective and may not change the behavior of the providers.
Our solution is to define global policies concerning the be-
havior of knowledge providers: considering specified behaviors
as violations and sanctioning them. In the case of entitlement,
this amounts to being obliged not to consider the specified be-
havior as a violation. For the case in which users are motivated
by sanctions only, in the sense that they are not respectful and
act according to the norm simply due to the existence of the
norm, our game-theoretic analysis shows that the existence of
nested obligations and permissions is not only too weak, it
is even superfluous. The only clause that is important is that
knowledge providers are sanctioned in the case that the user is
not acting as desired.
Similar scenarios occur when the global policies dictate that
the knowledge provider should oblige the user. In that case, the
knowledge provider can simply not create the obligation, or it
can create the obligation but not enforce it. Again von Wright’s
analysis of the transmission of will can be used to argue that
creating the obligation is not sufficient, the knowledge provider
should also enforce the obligations it created, and sanction users
that do not act according to them.
There are more requirements of secure knowledge-
management systems, which can be addressed in further re-
search. For example, our model should be extended to cope
with role-based access control using our role model [42] or
exploring the delegation issues of discretionary access control
using our contract model [19]. Finally, the current framework
can be extended to deal not only with policies consisting of
regulative rules like obligations, prohibitions, and permissions,
but also with constitutive rules specifying counts-as relations
and institutional facts [39]. In particular, in [38], we use counts-
as relations to specify local policies concerning authorizations,
while global policies prescribing constitutive rules are still an
open issue.
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